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This thesis studies the association of earnings and 
marital status. The relation between earnings and 
marriage is examined in two ways. One is concerned with 
whether marriage itself affects earnings. Another deals 
with the effect of expected earnings on age at marriage. 
In this thesis, empirical analyses of the two 
marr'iage-earnings issues are presented. Using the 1% 
1991 Hong Kong Census data, I study the marriage effects 
on earnings and find that both married men and women earn 
more than the unmarried counterparts. It is hypothesized 
that the marriage premium comes from the productivity 
enhanced by sharing of skills and knowledge wi th one's 
spouse inside a household, and the existence of such 
cross - producti vi ty effect is supported by the resul ts. 
It is further postulated that sharing of similar skills 
and knowledge are more efficient and beneficial, leading 
to the conclusion that higher cross-productivity effects 
exist when the couples are doing similar jobs. Empirical 
results support that couples doing similar jobs enjoy 
more cross-productivity premium, especially if both 
husband and wife are working in managerial class. 
In addition, expected wage , effects on age at 
marriage are investigated using the micro data of Taiwan. 
It is found that a positive and significant relation 
between the wage rate and age at marriage exists for men, 
whereas results for women are insignificant. An 
examination on duration of marriage effects on t he wage 
ii 
rate is carried out also using the Taiwan data. The 
duration of marriage effects is found to be 
insignificant. 
iii 
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Marriage and earnings is one of the important 
research areas which deserves much attention. Noticing 
the earnings differentials among different individuals, 
economists try to find out the determinants of earnings. 
And, it is discovered that there is a strong association 
between earnings and marital status. Moreover, married 
men are found to earn more than unmarried men (Becker 
1973, Benham 1974, Greenhalgh 
1986) . Such cross-sectional 
1980, Kenny 1983, Wong 
earnings differentials 
persist even when personal characteristics are 
controlled. If marital status pay differentials reflects 
productivity differences, then it will imply that changes 
in the marital status composition of the labor force may 
affect the productivity of the labor force and thus the 
performance of an economy. 
Another closely related issue concerns about the age 
differential between marriage partners. It is noted that 
men on average marry older than women. Economists 
attempt to find out the factors qffecting age at 
marriage. It is found that wages are associated with age 
at marriage in such a way that men who expect to succeed 
tend to marry later than the low-wage men (Bagnoli and 
Bergstrom 1993). 
Although a great deal of research has been done in 
this area , results and hypotheses are often different 
from one study to another. Moreover, little study has 
been done using Hong Kong and Taiwan data. Given the 
great difference in the culture and norms between Western 
society and Chinese society, the attitude towards 
marriage in these two societies may be different. 
Therefore ; it is interesting to see whether the marriage 
effect hypothesis holds for Chinese societies. The 
purpose of this thesis is to provide a more in-depth 
analysis of marriage and earnings by making. use of the 
Hong Kong and Taiwan data. 
There are three hypotheses of marriage effect in the 
marriage and earnings literature. They are employer 
favoritism hypothesis, unobservables hypothesis and 
cross-productivity hypothesis. An overview of these 
three hypotheses will be presented in chapter 11. 
Nevertheless, the study in this thesis will be carried 
out by focusing on cross-productivity hypothesis due to 
the lack of data of employers' preference and suggested 
'unobservables'. 
In this thesis, empirical analyse~ are divided into 
two parts. The first part attempts to examine marriage 




the marriage effects are 
cross-productivity effects. hypothesized to 
The existence of cross-productivity effects is then 
tested, and comparisons of cross-product i vity effects are 
2 
presented. The second empirical part analyzes expected 
wage effects on age at marriage, duration of marriage 
effects on earnings, and marriage effect on wives' labor 
~ 
supply. I use micro data of Hong Kong for the first 
part, and micro data of Taiwan for the second part study 
due to the lack of variables in Hong Kong data. 
The organization of this thesis is as follows: the 
next chapter is a brief review of the existing literature 
on marriage pay differentials and age at marriage 
theories. Various hypotheses of theories are. grouped and 
discussed in the literature review. Chapter III presents 
the overall estimation results and analyses of marriage 
differentials in Hong Kong. Chapter IV addresses issues 
regarding the age at marriage and the wage rate in 
Taiwan. The determinants of age at marriage are analyzed 
and, the wives' labor supply function is estimated by 
focusing on the marriage variables (e.g. husband's wage, 
presence of young children, dowry). Concluding remarks 
follow in Chapter V. 
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CHAPTER 11 
LITERA TURE REVIEW 
2.1 Marriage Pay Differentials 
It is an established finding in the literature of 
wage determination and cross-sectional income studies 
that married men earn substantially more than those who 
are not currently married. Most literature refers this 
difference as the marriage pay premium. It appears that 
marriage pay premium is not as significant for women as 
for men. It is more difficult to test the marriage-
earnings relationship among women because women tend to 
spec iali ze mor e in home production. There f ore, a more 
ambiguous r e lations hip be tween marr i a ge and women' s 
earnings is found. In this section, a br i ef review of 
studies of the marriage pay premium is presented. 
In the past decades, numerous studies have tried to 
explain the sources of the marriage pay premium on 
earnings. Broadly speaking, we ean classify them into 
three hypotheses. One major hypothesis is that earnings 
differentials come from productivity d i f f erentials. In 
other words, marriage, for various reasons, makes worker s 
more productive (Beeker 1973, 1981, 1985; Benham 1974; 
Greenhalgh 1980; Kenny 1983; Wong 1986). Another 
hypothesis argues that the premium is due to emp loyer 
favoritism (Hill 1979; Korenman and Neumark 1991). A 
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third explanation claims that it is the unobserved 
characteristics affecting both wages and marital status 
that cause an association between marital status and 
wages in cross-sectional studies (Cohen and Haberfeld 
1991; Nakosteen and Zimmer 1987; Gwartney and stroup 
1973). These three hypotheses will be discussed in turn 
as follows. 
Among these hypotheses, the most prevalent class of 
explanation seems to be the productivity hypothesis. It 
claims that married men are paid more in re$ponse to an 
actual productivity increase caused by the change in 
marital status (from an unmarried to a married man). In 
explaining the actual producti vi ty increase, economists 
have various ideas. One of these is the specialization 
argument. Economists argue that productivity is raised 
as marriage facilitates specialization in labor market 
production and household production. (Becker 1973, 1981, 
1985) . In Becker I s studies , it is shown that marriage 
lets the high wage spouse (most likely the husband) spend 
more time on making money, and the low wage spouse (most 
likely the wife) specialize in doing household 
production. The total production is then raised by 
specialization. Moreover, Becker als\1 finds that the 
gains from marriage are greater for high wage males than 
for low wage males. 
Greenhalgh (1980) conducts a similar research a nd 
tries to explain the wage differentials i n t erms of 
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market discrimination and family role specialization 
using the data from the General Household Surveys of 1971 
and 1975 in Great Britain. Greenhalgh compares the 
average earnings of different groups and attributes the 
residual (unexplained differential) to either 
discrimination or family r ole s pec i a li zation. From the 
data in Great Britain, it is found that the differential 
between single and married women due to family role 
specialization is 12%, and is 10% for men. 
Another explanation of the increase in productivity 
is the cross-productivity effect. According to this 
argument, wives are believed to improve household's 
decision making process, motivate men to work, and 
provide emotional support 
(1974) suggests that an 
ref lects one's own labor 
labor market productivity 
to men. Especially, Benham 
individual's earnings (Eo) 
market productivity, whereas 
is a function of the effective 
human capital stock, H of that person. H depends on the 
individual's own human capital stock, Ho and his/her 
spouse's human capital stock, Hs. More explicitly, 
(2 . 1) Eo = f ( H ) = g ( Ho, Hs ) , 
where BEo / BHo > 0 and BEo / BHs > o. 
It is assumed that the effective human capital stock of a 
married person is a positive function of the human 
capital of the marriage partner and this is the so-called 
cross-productivity effect. Benham believes tha t t he 
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positive cross-productivity effect is caused by the 
transfer of the benefits of education by the spouse. He 
explains that these benefits may arise in three ways: 
a) by extending advice and information, thereby 
providing a close sUbstitute for a person's own 
education; 
b) by helping one to acquire specific skills; and, 
c) by helping one to acquire general skills related to 
information acquisition and assimilation. 
Therefore, productivity is enhanced as benefits of 
education is transferred within marriage. 
Moreover, Wong (1986) makes 
Census Hong Kong Population data 







entrepreneurial families than 







interest, lower transaction cost and communication cost 
in the entrepreneurial families are the plausible reasons 
for higher cross-productivity effect. As a result, 
couples who share job-related skills and information can 
benefit more from each other's human capital, and in turn 
enhance each other's productivity substantially. 
Apart from the specialization argument and the 
cross-productivity effect hypothesis, Kenny (1983, 
pp.224-225) thinks that married men can accumulate human 
capital more rapidly because investment cost of huma n 
capital decreases after marriage. The reason for low 
7 
investment cost he offered is: "A man is able to borrow 
at lower cost from a wife than from other sources to 
finance investment in human capital; this is partly 
because alimony reduces the risk faced by wives when they 
finance their husbands' investment in human capital". 
Besides, he finds that married men work longer hours than 
unmarried men. As a result, a given level of annual 
investment in training consequently will be cheaper to 
married men who work more hours than unmarried men. This 
can also explain why married men's average investment 
cost is lower. Since males can accumulate human capital 
more rapidly when they are married, their productivity 
will increase accordingly. 
The second class of explanation for pay 
differentials is the employer favoritism hypothesis. It 
has been argued that marriage and labor participation are 
complementary for men but competitive for women. 
Korenman and Neumark (1991) use data on job grades and 
supervisor pe rforma nce ratings 
file and find that the pay 
associ at d with t hQ p rformanc 
from a company personnel 
differentials are highly 
r ting . It is not d t h t 
married workers tend to be placed in higher pa ying job 
grades , receive higher performance ratings than single 
men, and thus are more likely to be promoted. These 
observations can be partly explained by the fact that 
employers may find that married men have greater 
financial responsibility and, tend to be more stable and 
responsible, whereas married women are perceived to have 
8 
higher turnover rate and more absenteeism. It i s also 
possible for the employers to discriminate against 
unmarried men who are perceived to be in lesser financial 
need than their married counterparts. 
Hill (1979) investigates 
marital status and children 
the validity of using 






in labor force attachment, work 
He finds that the number of 
marital status is a good proxy 
variable for differential work history and labor market 
attachment. In addition, the number of children one 
bears indicates one's f inancial responsibilities to the 
family. Hill also finds that workers have greater 
financial responsibilities receive higher wages after 
numerous aspects of worker qualifications are controlled. 
On the other hand, some economists such as Cohen, 
Haberfeld, Nakosteen and Zimmer argue that the cross-
sectional effects of marital status on wages in fact do 
not exist. They attribute the pay differentials either to 
unobserved characteristics which affect both wages and 
marital status or to the wrong methodology employed in 
modeling. 
Cohen and Haberfeld (1991) claim that it is the 
omitted variables or unobserved characteristics rather 
than the marital status cause the pay differentials. The 
reason for the observed cross-sectional as s ociation 
9 
between marital status and wages is the omitted variables 
affecting both wages and marital status. The cross-
sectional effects disappear when a model using 
longit~dinal data is used. They suggest that the 
unobserved characteristics are the variables affect the 
success of men in bureaucracies. They speculate those 
variables are physical features, social structure, men's 
positions . within social networks, social relationships, 
conformity to social expectations, and so on. They find 
that above variables may affect both wages and the 
propensi ty to be marr ied, and these var iables are the 
variables that cause the pay differentials. 
Likewise, Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) find that 
there is a possibility that marital status is determined 
stochastically by a process whose random unobservable 
component is correlated with unobservables in the wage 
function. Therefore they estimate a model of earnings 
equation which permits endogenous selection of marital 
status. It is found that marital status fails to emerge 
as a source of enhanced earnings in the endogenous model. 
Moreover, Gwartney and stroup (1973, p.585) find 
that "Males who remain single might do so because most 
females accurately perceive that they will be unlikely to 
attain economic success." It is believed that high 
income men are more attractive in marriage markets and 
have higher propensity to get married. That is, economic 
success affects the propensity to g e t marr ied in other 
lO 
way around. This idea gives a new angle to look i nto the 
relation between marriage and earnings. other economists 
also build their theories of age at marriage and wage 
along t his line of thinking. In the next section, I will 
give a more detailed review of the research of this 
stream. 
2.2 Age at Marriage and Earnings 
In the literature of age at marriage theories, there 
is again no agreement on the relation between age at 
marriage and earnings. Economists dispute over age at 
which high-wage males enter into the marriage markets. 
The controversies arise from two opposite standpoints. 
One asserts that high-wage males get married at early age 
and thus there is a negative relation between age at 
first marriage and income. Another claims that there 
should be a positive relation between age at first 
marriage and income, that is, high-wage males marry 
later. 
Beeker (1973 , 197 4) argues t hat high- wage ma l es marry 
earlier rather than l ater because h igh-~age ma l es tend to 
gain more from marriage than low- wage ma les through 
enjoying greater returns to specialization by marrying 
low-wage females who specialize in doing household 
production. As there is more to be benef ited f rom be ing 
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married, high-wage males spend less time on searching 
marriage partners and hence marry earlier. 
Slmilarly, Keeley (1977) finds that high wage males 
and low wage females are more likely to enter the 
marriage markets at early age. The reason behind is that 
high wage males stand to gain more from specialization 
with low wage women within household. He regresses age-
at-first-marriage on wage, age and years of education and 
finds a negative coefficient of the wage rate for men. 
Keeley (1979) presents a more in-depth analysis of 
the de t e rminants of the a ge pattern of f i rst marriag e 
using data from the s t a t es in the U. S. . The the ory i s 
based on his work in 1977. He finds that variation in 
the parameters of the distribution of first marriage can 
be explained by variation in socio-economic variables 
that affect the gain from marriage and the cost of 
search. The gain from marriage and cost of search are 
two critical factors that determine age at entry into 
marriage markets and the duration of search, which in 
turn determine the age at marriage. Those socio-economic 
variable s a r e found t o be r e l a tive wages , sex ratio, 
education, population density, stand~rd deviation of 
education and wages, race, divorce laws and fraction of 
men in the military. 
However, Bergstrom and Bagnoli (1993) have opposite 
opinion. They argue that high wage men tend to marry 
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later. Noticing a universal phenomenon that mean age at 
marriage of males exceeded that of females, they model 
the difference in age at marriage of males and females 
based on the different economic roles between the sexes 
and the corresponding difference in the rate at which 
evidence of one's quality as a possible marriage partner 
is revealed. Men's role is perceived to be economic 
providers, - and their economic capabilities are revealed 
only after they have spent time in the work force. 
Females' anticipated tasks are child-bearing and child-
rearing, and their capabilities for these tasks are 
revealed once they reach physical maturity. Due to such 
differences, males who expect success find beneficial to 
get married until their economic capabilities are 
revealed. They tend to wait and marry at later age with 
more desirable females; males with poor prospects marry 
at an early age, whereas all females marry relatively 
early in life. 
Vella and Collins (1990) suggest that the average 
age differences between marriage partners is due to the 
preference of young and rich marriage partners. 
Moreover, individuals may find that they can ga i n wealth 
by postponing marriage and investing ~n human capital. 
Since males are more likely to succeed in market work 
than females, the gains from postponing marriage and 
investing in human capital are larger for them, and that 
is why males are likely to marry at older ages. 
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Bergstrom and Schoeni (1992) further investigate the 
relationship between age-at-first-marriage and the own 
wage of men by employing data from 1980 U. S. Census. 
They find a positive relation between age-at-first 
marriage and own wages of men but a much weaker relation 
for women. 
Facing these two opposite standpoints, Zhang (1995) 
tries to disentangle these seemingly mutually exclusive 
theories. He finds that both the Becker and Bergstrom-
Bagnoli hypotheses can hold in the sense that one 
hypothesis is more applicable to a particular group of 
men than the other. Using micro data from Taiwan, he 
separately analyzes the men with working wives and non-
working wives. He hypothesizes that the Becker 
specialization effect dominates for men with non-working 
wives and, the Bergstrom-Bagnoli revelation effect 
dominates for men with working wives. The result 
supports the hypothesis he placed and it sheds new light 
on the research of the wage- marriage age relation. 
A brief review of part of the multitude studies 
gives us some general ideas about the findings in the 
literature of marriage and earnings. Vprious hypotheses 
and explanations offered by the economists let us have 
more in-depth understanding of the phenomenon from 
different angles. In fact, the theories themselves are 
not compelling to each other. Each theory offers partial 
explanations for the questions. We should not rashly 
14 
conclude that one model is a full explanation of the 
phenomenon and neglect the others. In this thesis, 
empirical analyses of cross-producti vi ty effect and the 
> 
relationship between age at first marriage and the wage 
rate are presented using Hong Kong and Taiwan data 
respectively. It is hoped that research in this thesis 




MARRIAGE AND EARNINGS 
In recent years, considerable effort has been made 
to analyze the determinants of individual wages and 
earnings. It has been found that married men earn 
substantially more per hour worked than men who are not 
currently married. The cross-sectional wage 
differentials persist when control variables such as 
education, race, age and work experience are introduced. 
In this chapter, a complete empirical analysis is 
presented. section 3.1 provides a simple analysis of 
marital status in Hong Kong. 
marriage effect on earnings. 
section 3.2 analyzes the 
Section 3. 3 investigates 
the existence of cross-producti vi ty effect on earnings. 
section 3.4 further examines whether the cross-
productivity effect is higher in the families in which 
the couples working in the same industry. section 3.5 
studies the cross-productivity effect across managerial 
class and non-managerial class. sections 3.6 and 3.7 
repeat the analyses of section 3.4 and section 3.5 but 
focus on the families in which the coupl~s working in the 
same field l • 
IDefinition of ' same field' is stated in section 3.5. 
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3.1 A Simple Analysis of Marital Status in Hong Kong 
The data used for analysis in this chapter are from 
the 1% sample of the 1991 Hong Kong Population Census 
conducted by the government of Hong Kong. From the 
descriptive statistics shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we 
can see that 38% of male eligible population2 and 30% of 
female eligible population are single. That means that 
more than a half of eligible population are 'ever 
married,3. Focusing on the working sample, there are 64% 
ever married males and 55% ever married females. A large 
portion (over 90%) of married individuals are currently 
married while the widowed or divorced cases are below 5%. 
The mean years of schooling of single males are 11 
years which is greater than that of the ever married 
males. The difference in years of schooling is mainly 
due to the implementation of nine years compulsory 
education by the government since the 1970's. 
Consequently, the older males (especially those aged 
above 30) have received fewer years of formal education 
than the younger ones. 
From Table 3.2, we can see that ,the mean monthly 
earnings of single males (using the working sample) is 
HK$6606.7. Mean monthly earnings of currently married 
working males and divorced working males are about 1.5 
2Eligible population refers to all working or non-working people aged 16 to 65 who are eligible to 
work. 
3 Ever married people include people who are currently married, widowed and divorced or separated. 
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times of the single working males. Widowed working males 
earn the least on average. 
Moreover, it is noted that the mean age of the 
single males are much smaller than that of the ever 
married subgroups. Single males are aged 27 on the 
average, whereas the ever married males are over 40 on 
the average. Since married individuals are usually older 
than single counterparts, they thus have more working 
experience. Then, it is more difficult to separate the 
effect of working experience from marital - status by 
compar ing mean earnings of marr ied and unmarr ied one. 
Therefore, we can only get a general impression of the 
earnings distribution from the descriptive statistics. 
To have a more serious study, we have to separate the 
effects of the variables (age, marital status, education 
etc. ) resorting to econometric techniques. The later 
sections will focus on examining the marriage effect upon 
earnings while controlling the effect of other personal 
variables. 
Before going into the core analysis of marriage and 
earnings analysis, this section provides a basic 
understanding of marital status determination in Hong 
Kong. A simple probit equation of marriage is estimated 
as follows: 
(3 . 1) Currently Married = a + ~1 age + ~2 own 
education + ~3 language + c 
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where Currently Married = 1 if currently 
married 
= 0 otherwise 
(i.e. single, 
widowed or divorced) 
education = years of schooling 
language = 1 if Cantonese is the mother 
language 
= 0 otherwise 
Detailed definitions of all variables used in this 
thesis are shown in Table 3.3. The 1% 1991 Hong Kong 
Census data are employed to estimate (3.1). The results 
presented in Table 3.4 show that education has different 
effects on probability of getting married for male and 
female. As commonly observed, highly educated males are 
more likely to get married, but highly educated females 
are less likely to get married. Age has a positive 
effect on probability of getting married. The estimate 
of the language coeff icient is posi ti ve but not 
significant. 
If one can benefit from his or her spouse's 
education and earn more as predicted by the cross-
productivity hypothesis, then both of the highly educated 
males and females should be more likely to get married. 
As i t is f ound t ha t high l y e ducated f ema les are l ess 
like l y t o get marr i ed , such a result may contradict to 
t h e c ross-produc tiv ity hypothes i s . And i t has t o be 
19 
explained by theories other 
hypothesis. Since our main 
than cross-productivity 
concern is relationship 
between marriage and 
investigation of marital 
taken here. 




3.2 Regression Analysis for Marriage Effects on Earnings 
3.2.1 Model Specification 
To examine the factors leading to earnings 
differentials, an augmented version of the Mincer (1974) 




log Earnings = ~o + ~l experience 
+ ~2 experience2 
+ ~3 own education 
+ ~4 Dl + ~5 D2 
+ ~6 duration of residence in 
Hong Kong + ~7 nationality 
+ ~8 A + E 
Earnings = the monthly earnings from the 
main employment of an individual 
education = years of schooling 
experience = age - years of schooling - 6 
Dl = 1 if married 
20 
= 0 otherwise 
D2 1 if widowed, divorced or separated 
= 0 otherwise 
duration of residence = 1 if greater than or 
equal to 7 years in 
Hong Kong (permanent 
residents) 
= 0 otherwise 
nationality = 1 if one's nationality is British 
or Chinese 
= 0 otherwise 
A = inverse Mill's ratio to be 
defined) 
The above equation is estimated separately for men 
and women. Education level and experience are the 
personal characteristics other than marital status. The 
formulation of working experience (experience = age-years 
of schooling-6) is a conventional calculation of 
experience in labor economics. 4 On the other hand, 
duration of residence in Hong Kong and nationality in the 
specification are the dummy variables which capture the 
location-specific human capital differences or the labor 
market screening effects. Finally, E is the random 
disturbance term. 
4AlI formulations of working experience are only a pro>.')' of actual working experience. Since 
women tend to specialize more in home production, such a proxy may over-estimate the working 
experience of women. We should take this into considerations when interpretation of the working 
experience effect of women is made. 
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The sample is censored in the sense that earnings of 
the non-working eligible population are observed to be 
zero. Direct estimation of the earnings functions 
without adjusting for the choice of work status will lead 
to biased estimates. Heckman' s (1976) two-stage 
estimation method is commonly used in correcting the 
selectivity bias. The following is the procedures of 
this estimation method. 
1. Estimate the probit equation of the probability of 
working by maximum likelihood. 
(3.3) 
+ b 2 experiencei + b 3 experience2i 
+ b 4 l og other cash lncomei + bs Dli 
+ b 6 D2i + b 7 Head of the Household i 
+ ba log househ o ld i ncome· 1 
+ b9 elderly personi + ui 
where education is years of schooling; 
other cash income is non-labor income; 
Dl = 1 if married, 
= 0 otherwise; 
D2 = 1 if widowed, divorced or separated, 
= 0 otherwise; 
Head of the household = 1 if one is the household 
head, 
= 0 otherwise; 
Household income is the total income in the 
household; 
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Elderly person is 1 if there is (are) person(s) 
aged 60 or above in the household. 
In matrix form, (3.3) can be written as 
(3 .4) 
What we obs erve in the data is whethe r individual i 
works ( y i = 1 ) or not Yi = 0 and we use Yi * in 
( 3 . 3 ) as t he "latent " variab l e for t h i s dichotomous 
realization. Yi* would be defined as "propensity or 
ability to find employment". Individual i works if Yi * > 
0; otherwise that means he does not work. In other 
words, it is a binary choice selectivity model as 
follows . 
(3 .5) pi Probe Yi 1 ) Probe ui > -b'xi ) 
If the errors ui follow a normal distribution, we have 
the probit mode l. 
(3.6) L = TI pi TI ( 1 - Pi ) 
yi=l yi=O 
After est i ma t i ng t he prob i t e quat i on ~ 3.6 ) by max imum 
likelihood to obtain estimates of b, we can then compute 
estimate of inverse Mill's ratio A by (3. 7) for each 
observa tion i n t he se l ected sample . 
/\ /\ /\ 
(3.7) Ai = ~ ( b'xi ) / ~ ( b'xi 
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where ~ (.) is the standard normal pdf, and ~ (.) is the 
standard normal cdf. 
2. Include the inverse Mill's ratio as a regressor in the 
earning function (3.2). The resulting OLS estimates 
of the parameters of the earning functions will become 
consistent. s 
3.2.2 Data 
In the 1% sample data, the eligible population 
consists of 37898 persons whose age ranges from 16 to 65. 
Of the 37898 eligible populations, there are 19497 males 
and 18401 females. Samples of these observations are 
used to estimate the probi t equation of work. In the 
sample of eligible population, 7556 males and 5577 
females are never married; 11581 males and 11845 females 
are currently married; 161 males and 733 females are 
widowed; and 199 males and 246 females are divorced or 
separated. In addition, 83% of the 19497 male eligible 
population worked during the seven days before 
enumeration in the 1991 population census, and 54% of 
the 18401 female eligible population worked during the 
seven days before enumeration in the census. These 
working samples are used in the estimation of earnings 
functions. 
SFor details, see Heckman (1976, pp.4 75-492) , 
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Means and standard deviations of the variables of 
the eligible population samples are reported in columns 1 
and 3 of Table 3.5. The mean age for both men and women 
is 37. The mean log monthly earnings of men and women 
is 7.0 and 4.3 respectively. We can see that the monthly 
earnings difference between men and women is quite large. 
Since monthly earnings is determined by wage rate and 
number of hours worked and, it is speculated that most of 
the women do part-time job or do not work at all. The 
variation in working hours between men and women may be a 
plausible cause of the earnings difference. It may be 
further supported by the difference in the experience of 
working men and working women. It is seen that the mean 
years of experience is 30.06 years for men and 26.516 
years for women. However since number of working hours 
and the wage rate are not reported in the Census, we 
cannot verify whether the main cause of the earnings gap 
is the wage rate difference or the working hours 
difference. 
3.2.3 Enlpirical Results 
Results of probit estimation are shown in Table 3.6. 
It is found that married men are more likely to work 
while married women are less likely to work. The result 
may due to the role specialization between husband and 
wife in a family. Moreover, it is shown t hat people 
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having elderly people at home , e a rn i ng higher household 
income or being household head are more likely to work. 
Elderly people being dependents may impose a need for 
family to make more money. Besides, elderly people 
release housewife to go out to work by helping her to 
look after the young children. Therefore, presence of 
elderly people may raise one I s probability of working. 
The total "income of a household may indirectly reflect 
the conditions of labor market (e. g. easiness of job 
searching, mean wage rate). These conditions are 
positively related to the probability of working. 
Furthermore, people being household heads are usually the 
main wage earners in the families and thus have a higher 
probability to work. 
since no hourly wage is reported in the 1991 Hong 
Kong census, the dependent variable used in equation 
(3.2) is log monthly earnings. Monthly income is 
determined by hourly wage rate and number of working 
hours. Therefore log other cash income (non-labor 
income) may enter into equation (3.2) as a factor 
affecting the number of working hours. Two groups of 
estimates for equation (3.2) are reported in Table 3. 76 , 
one with log other cash income entered a s an independent 
variable in equation (3.2), and the other without the 
other cash income variable. 
~he regression results reported in this thesis have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
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The robust finding that currently married men earn 
more than unmarried ones is replicated in this study. 
Both of the two groups of estimates (with or without log 
other cash income as independent variable) show that the 
currently married men earn 11% to 16% more than the 
unmarried counterparts. The marriage effect is positive 
and significant. In addition, the widowers or divorced 
men also earn 7% more than the unmarried ones. It 
appears that the marital status of 'currently married' 
and 'widowed or divorced' are positively associated with 
earnings. 
Besides, the coefficient of log other cash income is 
positive and significant. It is expected that other cash 
income should have negative effect on working hours and 
thus have negative effect on monthly income. However, 
since other cash income is not remuneration for work 
(including interest , dividend, rental), "smart" people 
may master better investment strategies and receive more 
other cash income. In this way, other cash income may 
reflect one's unobserved producti vi ty (e. g. talent), and 
this may be the reason for the positive estimate of log 
other cash income. 
Moreover, the coefficients of the inverse Mill's 
ratios are statistically significant. This indicates the 
presence of sample censor ing. The selection bias are 
corrected using Heckman's correction method. 
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For women, it appears that al l of the estimates of 
the marriage dummies are positive and significant. The 
results of the two regressions (one with other cash 
income and the other without other cash income) are in 
parallel; they show that the currently married women earn 
much more than the widowed women, divorced women and 
single females. The widowed women and divorced women 
earn 32% to 38% more than the unmarried counterparts. 
Here I find that both married men and women earn 
higher income than the unmarried counterparts. However, 
marital status itself cannot explain the pay 
differentials. It is because marital status is a status 
representing whether an individual has ever had a spouse 
or not. It is not the status but the 'properties' of the 
status that cause the pay differentials. Therefore, in 
order to better understand the pay differentials, we have 
to find out what properties of 'currently married' affect 
an individual's productivity. 
There are various hypotheses in the literature 
suggesting different (but not mutually exclusive) 
marital variables7 to be the determinants of the earnings 
difference. since all hypotheses ' offer partial 
explanation to the problem, economists supporting one 
hypothesis may not necessarily mean that they refute the 
others. In this thesis, I try · to follow the most 
7 Marital variables here refers to the variables associated with the marital status. For example, 
spouse's years of schooling, social attitudes towa rds married men, and so on. 
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prevalent class of explanation and hypothesize the 
marriage effect coming from the cross- productivity 
effect. This topic is investigated in section 3.3. 
3.3 Regression Analysis for Cross-productivity Effects on Earnings 
The discussion in this section follows one of the 
most prevalent classes of explanation for the marriage 
pay premium by focusing on the wives' effect. More 
specifically, this section examines whether it is 
spouse's human capital (using education as a proxy) that 
raises one's productivity and leads to pay differentials. 
This is the cross-productivity effect within a household. 
In section 3. 1, posi ti ve marriage pay premium is 
found to be associated with currently married men. Now, 
I will try to examine whether the marriage pay premium 
comes from the cross-productivity effect. 
Recall equation (2.1) as follows, 
(2 • 1) Eo = f ( H ) = g ( Ho, Hs ) , 
where 8Eo I 8Ho > 0 and 8Eo I OH s > o. 
As stated in section 2. 1, it is postulated that a 
person's own labor-market productivity depends on the 
one's own human capital stock, Ho and the spouse's huma n 
capital stock, Hs. In this section, I will take a s t e p 
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further to study the cross-producti vi ty effect. The 
variable "spouse's education" will be introduced into the 
earnings function and only the data of the married 
individuals who currently lived with their spouse at the 
survey date are employed. 
3.3.1 Model Specification 
The model employed in the study is as follows. The 
regressions are estimated for men and women separately. 
(3.8) log Earnings = ao + a1educationi 
+ a2 experiencei 
+ a3 experience2i 
+ a4 spouse's education 
+ as log other cash incomei 
+ a6 duration of residence in 
Hong Kong + a 7 nationality 
+ aB 'A + lli 
where the spouse's education is the spouse's years of 
schooling. 
Again, I use Heckman's (1976) two-stage estimation 
method to correct the selectivity bias in estimating 
equation (3.8). It is hypothesized that a4 is positive, 
indicating that spouse's education may raise one's own 
productivity and lead to higher earnings. 
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3.3.2 Enlpirical Results 
Probit estimation results of equation (3.8) are 
shown in Table 3.8. The results are similar to those of 
the full sample. It is found that people having higher 
education, earning more household income, being household 
head are more likely to work, whereas people with higher 
other cash income (non-labor income) are less likely to 
work. 
The empirical results of equation (3.8) are reported 
in columns 3 and 6 of Table 3.7. Estimates of one's own 
education and spouse's education for married individuals 
are positive and statistically significant. since 
earnings is reflected by productivity, that means an 
individual' s productivity is improved by one's spouse's 
education as well as by one's own education. The 
estimates of spouse's education for husbands and wives 
are 0.0363 and O. 0316 respectively. It appears that 
husbands benef it more from the spouse's education than 
wives. 
In the model specification, the nationality dummy is 
used to c apture the l abor market screening effects and 
location specific human capital differences. Since Hong 
Kong is a British colony, it is interesting to see 
whether British nationality or Chinese national i t y has 
significant effect on earnings when comparing with other 
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nationalities. The estimate of nationality dummy is 
positive and significant for men but negative and 
insignificant for women. This seems to imply market 
screening effects or location specific human capital 
differences exist for men. Men with British nationality 
or Chinese nationality earn more. 
The coefficients of the inverse Mill's ratio are 
statistically 
statistically 
significant for married women but 
insignificant for married men which 
indicating that there is presence of sample censoring for 
women only. 
It is found that the coefficient of education does 
not change much when the variable 'spouse's education' in 
equation 3.8 is dropped. Such an estimation is carried 
out to see whether spouse's education has a net effect or 
not. The estimation results are presented in Table 3.7a. 
In short, a significant cross-productivity effect on 
earnings is present in Hong Kong. In the next section, I 
will try to narrow our focus and further investigate 
whether couples have occupation in the same industry may 
have a higher cross-productivity effect. · 
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3.4 Cross-productivity Effects upon Earnings 
for Couples Working in the Same Industry vs. 
Couples Working in Different Industries 
It is intuitive that people can improve their skills 
and produc tivity by e xc h a nging experience wi th other 
people who are performing similar jobs. And it leads one 
to wonder whether benef its from spouse's education are 
greater in the f amily where simila r s kills can be shared. 
Couples working in the same i ndustry appear to have more 
chance to share simila r s kill s or e xperience. The r efor e , 
it is postulated that the cross-producti vi ty effect in 
the families in which the couples working in the same 
industry is greater than that in the families in which 
the couples working i n di fferent indus tries . 8 
3.4.1 Data 
To test the above hypothesis, only the working 
sample of the married men and women in the data of Hong 
Kong is used. There are 460 pairs of couples working in 
the same industry. In thi s group of people, the mean of 
log monthly earnings is 8.98 and 7.38 fdr men and women 
respectively (see columns 1 and 5 of Table 3.9). 
Besides, there are 1001 pairs of couples working i n 
different industries. In this group of people, the mean 
of log monthly earnings is 8.91 and 8.83 for men a nd 
8 The endogeneity of industry or occupation selection is not taken into consideration in the analyses. 
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women respectively (see columns 2 and 6 of Tabl e 3.9). 
It is found that other characteristics of these two 
groups of people are more or less the same. The mean of 
the own education for the two groups are about 10 years. 
The mean working experience are 24 years for men and 20 
for women. 
By the "same industry" I mean that one person has 
the same industry code with his/her spouse. The industry 
is categorized by the subdivision of 1) Manufacturing 
industry; 2) Construction; 3) Transport, storage and 
communication industry; 4) Financing, insurance, real 
estate and business services; 5) Community, social and 
personal services; 6) Others. "Couple work in the same 
industry" is characterized by "both husband and wife work 
in the same subdivision of the above major division". An 
example could be that both husband and wife work in the 
textiles industry which is the subdivision of the 
Manufacturing industry. 
3.4.2 Model Specification 
An interactive variable 'ind*spouse's education' is 
introduced in the earnings function to test whether the 
cross-productivity effect is greater in the families in 
which the couples working in the same industry. ' ind' 
is an industry dummy variable. positive coefficient b9 
(see below) represents a greater c ross-productivity 
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effect in the families in which the couples working in 
the same industry. In addition, 'sex' is the sex dummy 
used to identify the sex difference effect on earnings. 




log Earnings = a + b1experience 









+ b3 own education 
+ b4 spouse education 
+ bs duration of residence in 
Hong Kong 
+ b 6 nationality 
+ b 7 log other cash income 
+ b8 sex + b9 ind*spouse's 
education + u 
if male 
otherwise 
if work in the same industry as 
one's spouse (with the same industry 
code) 
= 0 otherwise 
3.4.3 Empirical Results 
The results are reported in column 1 of Table 3.10. 
The coefficient of sex dummy is positive indicating that 
there is a sex premium for male over female on e arnings. 
35 
However, we should not rashly interpret this as sex 
discrimination. since there 
difference between male and 
difference between two sexes 
may be a 
female, 




difference and sex discrimination. A more rigorous 
treatment is to separate these two effects. However, as 
our focus in this thesis is not on sex discrimination, 
the result reported here only gives a general idea of sex 
effect on earnings. 
Notice that spouse's education has positive effect 
on earnings. And the core result is that the cross-
productivity effect of couples working in different 
industries is 0.0307, whereas the cross-productivity 
effect of couples working in the same industry is 
8Earnings/ospouse's education = 0.0307 + 0.0077*ind = 
0.0384. This implies "working in the same industry" 
increases the cross-productivity effect and is consistent 
with our hypothesis stated at the beginning of this 
section. 
Furthermore, 8EarningsjOlndustry Dummy = 0.0077* 
spouse I s education. That means that the knowledge and 
skills are shared more efficiently between the more 
educated couples. 
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3.5Further Analysis of Couples Working 
in the Same Industry: Cross-Productivity 
Effects on Earnings for Managerial Class 
Couples vs. Non-managerial Class Couples 
It is noted that some types of skills are more 
difficult and takes more time to go through the stages of 
teaching, learning, practicing and mastering. An example 
would be craft and art skills. Therefore, these type of 
skills are more difficult to be shared or generalized. 
Some types of skills (e.g. clerical skills) are easier to 
be generalized. The easiness of generalization may 
affect the efficiency of skills sharing in a family. And 
it is suspected that the easiness of skills 
generalization varies across broad occupational 
categories due to the distinct characteristics of the 
occupational nature. 9 Therefore, cross-productivity 
effects may differ across occupational categories. 
It has been shown in section 3.4 that the cross-
productivity effects are larger among the families in 
which the couples work in the same industry. This 
section attempts to investigate whether the cross-
productivity effects differ within this type of families 
(in which the couples work in the same industry) due to 
9Neuman and Ziderman (1992) have a research on this topic. They study the cross-productivity 
effects in different labor market contexts. They find that positive cross-productivity effects of wife's 
education on husband's earnings are present in the primary labor market sector but not in the 
secondary labor market sector. 
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different occupation categories they choose (managerial 
class vs. non-managerial class). 
The classification of the occupation in the census 
follows the major groups and the sUb-major groups of the 
International standard Classification of Occupationsl O 
with local adaptation in Hong Kong. In this thesis, I 
classify the occupations under the major division of 
'Managers and administrators' , 'Professionals' , and 
'Associate professionals' as managerial occupations; the 
occupations under the major division of 'Clerks', 
'Service workers and shop sales workers', 'Craft and 
related workers', 'Plant and machine operators and 




The sample used is the individuals who work in the 
same industry as that of their spouses. There are 460 
pairs of couples in the sample. Of the 460 pairs of 
couples, 171 pairs of couples are such that both husband 
and wife are working in the managerial class, 289 pairs 
are such that either husband or wife or both are working 
in the non-managerial class. 
l<>-rhe outline of classification is stated in the manual of the 1991 1 % Hong Kong Census. 
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3.5.2 Model Specification 
To test whether the cross-producti vi ty effects are 
greater in the families in which the couples working in 
the managerial class, an interactive variable 
~~mgr*spouse's education" is put in the equation, where 
mgr equals one if both husbands and wives are in the 
managerial class. positive coefficient b g may mean a 
greater cross-productivity effects in the families in 
which the couples working in the managerial class. 
Again, 'sex' is the sex dummy used to identify the sex 
difference effects on earnings. 
(3.10) 
where 
log Earnings = a + b l experience 
+ b2 experience2 
sex = 1 
= 0 
mgr = 1 
= 0 
+ b3 own education 
+ b4 spouse's education 
+ b 5duration of 
residence in Hong Kong 
+ b 6 nationality 
+ b 7 log other cash income 
+ ba sex + bg mgr*spouse's 
education + u 
if male 
otherwise 
if both husband and wife are 
in managerial class 
otherwise 
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3.5.3 En1pirical Results 
The results of estimation are reported in column 2 
of Table 3.10. The spouse's education effect is positive 
for either managerial class or non-managerial class. It 
is noted fhat 8Earnings/8spouse' s education = 0.0071 + 
0.0465*mgr. There are greater cross-productivity effects 
for the couples working in managerial class. If the 
reasoning stated ,in the beginning of this section is 
correct, then the results may imply that managerial 
skills are easier to be shared and generalized than non-
managerial skills. Another reason for the greater cross-
productivity effects for managerial class families may be 
that sharing of managerial skills generates higher 
productivity. It can be seen that managers have higher 
earnings because greater productivity is generated by 
their managerial skills. The second explanation appears 
to be more plausible. It is because sharing or acquiring 
managerial skills may not seem as easier as sharing of 
non-managerial skills, but it may raise one's value of 
productivity in greater magnitude once the skills are 
shared. 
Notice that there is positive premium for the 
permanent residents (0.2429). It is believed that 
permanent residents (duration of residence greater than 7 
years) may have more location specific knowledge of Hong 
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Kong than the non-permanent residents. The positive 
estimate for the duration of residence implies either the 
presence of both location specific human capital 
differences or market screening effects. 
3.6 Cross-productivity Effects upon Earnings 
for Couples Working in the Same Field vs. 
Couples Working in Different Fields 
In the section 3.4, I conf ine samples to couples 
working in the same 
different industries. 
industry and couples working in 
Now I turn to analyze the couples 
who work in the same field or otherwise. For the "same 
field", I mean that both of the husband and wife work in 
the field classified by the major division of industry. 
For example, couples working in two different industries, 
say, textiles industry and paper products industry would 
be classified as working in the "same field". It is 
because both of them are working in the field under the 
major division of 'Manufacturing'. Thus, "same industry" 
is a subset of "same field". 
3.6.1 Data 
The sample used is the married working sample of the 
1% 1991 Hong Kong Census data. There a re 60 6 pairs of 
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couples working in the same field and 855 pairs of 
couples working in different fields. 
3.6.2 Model Specification 
Same model of equation (3.9) is used in this study 
except that a field dummy variable 'fld' is used to 
identify whether one is working in the same field as that 
of the spouse. 
(3.11) 
where 
log Earnings = a + b l experience 
+ b2 experience2 
+ b 3 own education 
+ b4 spouse education 
+ bs duration of residence in 
sex = 1 
= 0 
fld = 1 
= 0 
Hong Kong + b 6 nationality 
+ b7 log other cash income 
+ b8 sex + b9 fld*spouse's 
education + \) 
if male 
otherwise 
if work in the "same field" as 
of one's spouse 
otherwise 
that 
3.6.3 Empirical Results 
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The empirical results are reported in column 3 of 
Table 3.10. Findings obtained in this section are 
similar to those in section 3.4.4. For the couples 
working in 'different fields', the cross-productivity 
effect is equal to 0.0302. This means that spouse' s 
education has positive effect on earnings. And, for the 
couples working in the 'same field', 8Earnings/ 8spouse's 
education - 0.0302 + 0.0073*fld = 0.0375, implying 
"working in the same field" increases the cross 
productivity effects. However, cross-productivity 
e ffect s are large r for the couples working in the ' same 
i ndustry ' than f or the coup l es work i ng i n t he ' same 
field' (0. 03 84 > 0.03 75). It is c onsistent with the 
i dea s tha t be nefits from s haring s i mi l ar s k i lls and 
information are greater when the job contents of the 
couples are closer. 
3.7Further Analysis of Couples Working 
in the Same Field: Cross-Productivity 
Effects on Earnings for Managerial Class 
Couples vs. Non-managerial Class Couples 
I n section 3.5, I have already discussed t hat t he 
c ross-productivit y effect s diffe r among f ami lies in whic h 
couples work in the • same industry' but with different 
occupation categories. It was found that the cross-
productivity effects are larger among the familie s i n 
which the c ouples are both in manageria l class than that 
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of the families in which either husband or wife is in 
non-manager ial class. Now, I repeat the exercise of 
section 3.5 and examine whether the cross-productivity 
effects among families in which couples working in the 
'same field' are different due to different occupations 
they choose. 
3.7.1 IJata 
The sample used are the individua l s who work in the 
same field as that of their spouses. There are 606 pairs 
of couples in the sample. Of the 606 pairs of couples, 
201 pairs of couples are such that both husband and wife 
are working in the managerial class, and 405 pairs are 
such that either husband or wife is working in the non-
managerial clas s. 
3.7.2 Model Specification 
The model used in this study is the same as the one 
used in section 3.5.2, except that the sample used here 
is the married couples working in ·the same field 
instead of working in the same industry. The 
occupation dummy 'mgr' denotes whether the couples are 




log Earnings = a + b I experience 
+ b 2 experience2 
+ b3 own education 
+ b 4 spouse's education 
+ b s duration of residence in 
Hong Kong + b 6 nationality 
+b7 log other cash income 
+ba sex +bg mgr*spouse's 
education + u 
mgr = 1 if both husband and wife are 
in the managerial class 
= 0 otherwise 
3.7.3 Empirical Results 
The results are reported in column 4 of Table 3.10. 
Cross-productivity effects are higher in the families in 
which both husband and wife are in managerial class than 
the families in which either husband or wife or both are 
in non-managerial class. For the non-managerial class, 
the cross-productivity effect is 0.0038 when the couples 
work in the same field, whereas cross-productivity effect 
is 0.0071 when the couples work in the same industry. 
The cross-productivity effects are larger for the 
managerial couples working in the same industry (0.0536) 
than those working in the same field (0.0493). 
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In short, there are three main findings concerning 
the cross-productivity effect. The first finding is that 
managerial families benefit more from sharing the similar 
skills and knowledge than non-managerial families. The 
reason for this finding may be that the managerial skills 
are more difficult to acquire comparing with the low 
level skills used in the non-managerial class. Besides, 
good managerial skills may raise the productivity of the 
inputs, therefore the return to such skills is higher. 
The second finding is that the efficiency of sharing 
information and skills are improved when the couple's job 
contents get closer and thus it leads to a greater 
benefits from the cross-productivity effects. The third 
finding is that couples working in the same industry 
benefit more from the cross-productivity effects, no 
matter they are working in managerial class or in non-
managerial class. 
In this chapter, the productivity hypothesis of the 
marriage effect on earnings is tested. The variable of 
spouse's education is put into the earnings function 
besides one's own education. After incorporating the 
variable of spouse's education into the model, the 
estimate of own education is still significant. 
Moreover, it is found that the coefficient of spouse's 
education is as significant as one's education in most of 
the cases. 
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The above findings are consistent with those of 
other related literature (Wong 1986, Neuman and Ziderman 
1992) . In these studies, a similar model specif ication 
is employed but using different sample of data. That 
means cross-productivity effect is proved to be 
significant for various countries using different samples 
of data from different countries. This may indicate 
that the positive cross-productivity effect is widespread 
and, the wage and marriage relationship is similar across 
countries. 
However, someone may argue that the so-called cross-
productivity effect is only a signalling effect. The 
argument is that the premium associated with spouse's 
education indicates an individual to be ... ... smart" and 
thus have a educated wife. That means, the premium is 
not due to producti vi ty caused by wife's education but 
one's own productivity signalled by wife's education. 
And, it is because some variables indicating an 
individual's own productivity are missing and the effect 
is captured by spouse's education. Therefore, to verify 
the cross-productivity hypothesis, I have to examine 
whether there is a productivity increase after marriage. 
I will complete the analysis in chapter V by 
incorporating the variable of 'duration of marriage' to 
examine the cross-productivity effect. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WAGE AND AGE AT MARRIAGE 
4.1 Regression Analysis of Wage Effect on Age at Marriage 
Labor economists find that married men tend to earn 
more than unmarried men. There is another closely 
related but separate literature on the examination of the 
relationship between expected earnings and the age at 
marriage. It e xamines how earn i ng potential a ffect s the 
age at marriage and explains the age difference of 
marriage for males and females. 
It has been observed that in most times and places, 
women on average marry older men. Bagnoli and Bergstrom 
(1993) suggest that the age difference at marriage 
between males and females is a result of the different 
economic roles of males and females. The economic role 
for males is money- making, and male's economic 
capabilities may be revealed only gradually after he has 
spent time in the work force. In contrast, female's 
anticipated tasks will be childbearing, so once she has 
reached physical maturity, the passage of time adds 
little information about her capabilities for these 
tasks. Bagnoli-Bergstrom's model predicts that males who 
expect to have lower earnings in . later life will get 
married at younger ages, but those who expect to have 
more earnings in later life will ge t married at older 
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ages. In this section, I will examine the relationship 
between the earnings in later life and age at marriage]] . 
4.1.1 Model Specification 
To test the theoretical relationship between age at 
marriage arid wage in later life for males and females 
proposed by Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1991), the following 
equation will be estimated for both males and females: 
(4 • 1) Age at Marriage = a + ~l log hourly wage rate 
+ ~2 age + ~3 education + u 
The formulation of the equation is mainly based on 
the model proposed by Bergstrom and Schoeni (1992). The 
actual wage rate is used as one's expected earnings 
prospects as in Bergstrom and Schoeni ( 1992) and Zhang 
(1995) . 
4.1.2 Data 
This study uses a set of extracted data from a 1989 
island-wide family survey of Taiwan women aged 25 to 59. 
There are 2167 observations in the data set. The sample 
used in this section is called working sample I; the 
lIThe theory assumes that high earnings in later life positively correlates wi th the earnings in young 
life. 
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means and standard deviations of the variables used in 
the model are reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 4.1. 
After extracting the working sample and deleting the 
. 
observations with missing variables, there are 1530 
currently married men and 1117 currently married women in 
the sample. Since I am going to examine the relationship 
between age at marriage and wage in later life, I confine 
my attention to currently married individuals who are 40 
years old or 01derl 2 in the working sample I. There are 
808 husbands and 439 wives who are 40 years old or above 
in working sample I. As the number of working hours is 
reported in the survey, the var iable log wage rate is 
used in the study. The a verage l og hourly wage rate is 
4.4793 for husbands and 3.8466 for wives. The mean age 
i s 48.6 09 for husbands a nd 46. 1 64 f or wi ves . 
4.1.3 Empirical Results 
The results are reported in Table 4.2. The estimate 
of the log hourly wage rate for men is positive and 
significant, implying that the more able is an individual 
to make money, the later will the individual get married. 
This result conforms with the ideas of Bagnoli and 
Bergstrom that males with poor prospects marry at an 
early age and those who expect success will marry later 
in life. 
12The selection of age group follows Bergstrom and Schoeni (1992)'s study of income prospects and 
age at marriage. 
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On the other hand, it is found that the coefficient 
of the log hourly wage rate for women is insignificant 
though posi ti ve. Explanation offered by Bagnoli and 
Bergstrom (1992) is that females are expected to be less 
involved in market work than males, therefore it is less 
likely for their earnings in later life to be related to 
the des irab"i 1 i ty as marr iage partners. Thus, a weaker 
relation between wage earnings and age at marriage for 
fema le$ than f or ma l es i s expected. 
4.2 Regression Analysis of Marriage 
Duration Effects on Wage Rate 
In the theory of wives' effects on earnings, it is 
suggested that marriage raises the income of males and 
also the growth rate of earnings, that is, the longer is 
the duration of marriage, the more cross-productivity 
gains can the couple benefit. However, as I have 
mentioned in the previous chapter that there is also a 
concern that marital status exerts only a signalling 
effect rather than a productive effect. It is thus 
important to see whether marriage really reflects 
"omitted ability" or human capital accumulation during 
marriage. In order to dif f erentiate these two 
hypotheses, a variable of marriage duration is introduce d 
into the earnings function estimation. A signif icant 
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marriage d uration effect ma y l e nd support t o huma n 
capital accumulation hypothesis and refute the signall ing 
hypothesis. since the study of marriage duration effect 
on earnings is not possible for Hong Kong due to the lack 
of data on "marriage duration". 
data to do the estimation. 
I resort to the Taiwan 
4.2.1 Model Specification 
The following model is used to examine · the above 
theory. As mentioned above, a probit equation is used to 
correct the selection bias. 
(4.2) 
where 
Yi* = ba + b I experiencei + b2 experiencei2 
+ b 3 own educationi + b 4 educmi 
+ bs richg i + b 6 preschool childreni + Ui 
educm denotes mother's years of schooling 
richg = 1 if one's father-in-law is rich 
= 0 otherwise 
preschool children = 1 if one's youngest child 
is less than age 6 
= 0 otherwise 
An earnings function (4.3) is the n est i ma t e d using the 
inverse Mill's ratio derived from probit equation (4.2) 
to correct the selection bias. 
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(4 • 3) 
4.2.2 Data 
log hourly wage rate = a + blown education 
+ b2 spouse education 
+ b 3 exper ience 
+ b4 experience
2 
+ b 5duration of 
marriage* spouse's 
education + b 6 A + € 
The sample size of eligible population is 1537 and 
1216 for men and women respectively after the 
observations with missing values are deleted. The 
eligible population sample is used for probit equation 
estimation. There are 1525 men and 1111 women worked in 
the market in the survey month. These are the working 
sample 11. Labor participation for men is higher than 
99%, so it does not seem necessary to correct selection 
bias for men. The means and standard deviations are 
reported in columns 2, 4 and 5 of Table 4.1. 
4.2.3 En1pirical Results 
In the probi t estimation , it is found that wives 
with higher education are more likely to work. 
Probability of the a randomly selected woman to work is 
higher if her mother's education is higher, but lower if 
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her father-in-Iaw's wealth is higher. Wives with 
children under 6 years old is less likely to work as 
expected (see Table 4.3). 
The findings of wage function estimation are 
reported in Table 4.3. It is noted that the estimated 
coefficients of spouse's education are positive and 
significant for both husbands and wives, whereas the 
estimates of the interactive variable spouse's 
education*duration 
insignificant. 
of marriage are positive but 
All in all, though both spouse's education and own 
education are found to have positive and significant 
effect on one's wage, the marriage duration effect is 
found to be insignif icant. The results do not lend 
support to the hypothesis of human capital accumulation 
during marriage. 
4.3 Regression Analysis of Marriage Effect on 
Wives' Labor Supply 
There is a close linkage between labor supply, 
earnings, and marital factors. Earnings and marital 
factors are the main determinants of labor supply 
especially for married women. Marital factors such as 
value of dowry, husband's wage, presence of young 
childre n a ff ect the labor supp ly of married women in 
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household production and market production. It is 
postulated that value of dowry and husband's wage have 
positive income effect and so they lead to a reduction of 
labor supply)3. Presence of young children also reduces 
wives' labor supply as mothers have to spend more time to 
look after children. 
4.3.1 Model Specification 
The model used to study wives' labor supply is as 
follows. 
(4.4) Weekly hours of work = a + Yl predicted log wage 
where 
+ Y2 log dowry +Y3 age 
+ Y4 age2 + Ys preschool 
children + Y6 husband's 
monthly earnings + Y7 A + U 
A is inverse Mill's ratio (computed from 
equation 4.2) 
predicted log wage is the expected wage in 
earnings function (computed from equation 4.3) 
log dowry is log of real value of dowry 
preschool children = 1 if individual's 
youngest children is 
less than age 6 
13 Labor supply refers to the number of hours worked in the labor market. Here I confine the 
definition to be the number of weekly hours of work in the labor market. 
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= 0 otherwise 
4.3.2 Empirical Results 
The labor supply estimates of married women are 
reported in Table 4.4. We can see that the effect of log 
own wage is negative in labor supply function (4.4) which 
shows a backward-bending labor supply. The income effect 
dominates the sUbstitution effect for women. That is, 
increase in wage rate leads to reduction of working 
hours. 
Furthermore, in estimation of equation (4.4), the 
effect of husbands' earnings on wives' labor supply is 
negati ve. since husbands' earnings can be treated as a 
proxy of wives' non-labor income, increase in non-labor 
income has a positive income effect , which reduces wives' 
labor supply. 
It is noted that the presence of the children aged 
less than 6 exerts a negative effect on women' s labor 
supply. It is very intuitive that mothers have to spend 
much more time to take care of younger children and thus 
their labor supply reduces accordingly. 
Dowry effect on labor supply is negative but not 
significant. A plausible reason is that dowry value is 
not high enough and the income effect is too weak to be 
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picked up given the small sample size. We can see that 
the mean nominal dowry value is 89364 yuan (see Table 
4.5) and , it is only about 7 times of the wives' mean 
monthly earnings (12878 yuan). Therefore, the income 
effect of receiving such amount of money after marriage 
may not be strong enough to affect the labor supply of 
wives. 
All in all, the estimation of this chapter completes 
the analysis of cross-productivity effect. The overall 
results suggest that the cross-productivity is 
significant for men. Besides, the age of marriage of men 
is positively related to expected earnings. These 
results are consistent with those of the related studies. 
The analysis of cross-productivity by field, industry or 
occupation is a good contribution to the literature. One 
of the major findings in wives' labor supply function is 
that husband's wage and presence of young children also 
play great roles in determining wives' working hours 
besides her own wage. Dowry apparently has little effect 
on female's labor supply. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis I attempt to bring new evidence of 
marriage pay premium by studying Hong Kong and Taiwan 
data. There are eight principal findings. 
First, it is found that both married men and women 
earn higher income than the unmarried counterparts. The 
currently married men earn 11% to 16% more and the 
widowers earn 7% more income than the unmarried ones. 
The currently married women earn 19% to 67% more than 
single females. On the other hand, the widowed women and 
divorced women earn 32% to 38% more than the unmarried 
counterparts. 
Second, the estimates of one's own education and 
spouse's education for married individuals are positive 
and statistically significant. An individual's 
productivity is improved by one's spouse's education as 
well as by one's own education. This indicates the 
existence of cross-productivity effects. 
Third, couples working in the same industry or in 
the same field as that of one's spouse enjoys higher 
cross-productivity effects. Moreover, cross-productivity 
effects are larger for the couples working in the s ame 
industry than for the couples working in the same field. 
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This result is consistent with the idea that benef its 
from sharing similar skills and information are more when 
the job contents of the spouse are closer. 
Fourth, 
sharing the 
managerial families benefit more from 
similar skills and knowledge than non-
managerial families. Both managerial and non-managerial 
couples working in the same industry benefit more from 
cross-productivity effects than those working in the same 
field. 
Fifth, in the analysis of wage effect on age at 
marriage, the estimate of the log hourly wage rate for 
men is positive and significant, whereas the coefficient 
of the log hourly wage rate for women is insignificant 
though posi ti ve. The results conform with the idea of 
Bagnoli and Bergstrom. Males with poor prospects marry 
at an early age and those who expect to succeed will 
marry later in life. Females are expected to be less 
involved in market work than males. Therefore, a weaker 
relation between wage earnings and age at marriage for 
females than for males is expected. 
Sixth, marriage duration effect is found to be 
insignificant. 
Finally, it is found that husband's wage and 
presence of young children has negative effect on wives' 
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working hours. The dowry effect is small and 
insignificant. 
In this thesis, the analysis mainly attempts to test 
the cross-productivity effect (one of the most prevalent 
classes of explanation for the marriage effect on 
earnings) . This hypothesis only reveals part of the 
picture. various hypotheses have to be combined in order 
to give a whole picture. Further research can be focused 




Bagnoli, Mark., and Bergstrom, Theodore C. "Courtship as a Waiting game." Journal 
of Polit~cal Economy, 1993, pp.185-202. 
Becker, Gary S. "A Theory of Marriage: Part 1." Journal of Political Economy 8 J, 
July-August, 1973, pp.813-846. 
Becker, Gary S. "A Theory of Marriage: Part n." Journal of Political Economy 82, 
March-April,1974, sll-33. 
Becker, Gary S. -A Treatise on the Family. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA. 
1981 . 
Becker, Gary S. "Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor." Journal 
of Labor Economics 3 (1, Part 2), 1985 : s33-58 . 
Benham, Lee. "Benefits of Women's Education within Marriage." Journal of Political 
Economy 82, March-April 1974: s57- s71 . 
Bergstrom, Theodore C., and Schoeni, Robert . "Income Prospects and Age at 
Marriage." Working paper. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1992. 
Cohen, Yinon, and Haberfeld, Yitchak. "Why Do Married Men Earn More than 
Unmarried Men?" Social Science Research (1991), 20, pp.29-44. 
Greenhalgh, Christine. "Male-Female Wage Differentials in Great Britain: Is Marriage 
An Equal Opportunity?" Economic J01lrnal (1980), 90, pp. 751 -775. 
Gwartney, 1., and Stroup, R.. "Measurement of Employment Discrimination 
according to Sex." Southern Economic Journal (1973), 39, pp.575-587. 
Heckman, lames 1. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, 
Sample Selection, and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimator for 
Such Models." Annals of Economic and Social Measurenlent: 5 (1976), pp.475-
492. 
Hill, Martha. "The Wage Effect of Marital Status and Children." Journal of Human 
Resources (1979), 14(4), pp.579-594. 
Keeley, Michael C. "The Economics of Family Formation." Economic Inquiry (1977) , 
15, pp.238-250. 
Keeley, Michael C. "An Analysis of the Age Pattern of First Marriage." International 
Economic Review (1979),20(2), pp.527-544. 
61 
Kenny, Lawrence. "The Accumulation of Human Capital During Marriage by Males." 
Economic Inquily (1983), 21 (2), pp .223-231. 
Korenman, Sanders, and Neumark, David. "Does Marriage Really Make Men More 
Productive?" 10urnal of Human Resources, Spring 1991, pp.282-307 . 
Nakosteen, Robert, and Zimmer, Michael. "Marital Status and Earnings of Young 
Men." 10urnal of Human Resources (1987),22(2), pp.248-268 . 
Neuman, Shoshana, and Ziderman, Adrian. "Benefits of Women's Education within 
Marriage: Results for Israel in a Dual Labor Market." Economic Development and 
Cultural Change (1992), pp.413-424. 
Wong, Yue-chim. "Entrepreneurship, Marriage, and Earnings." Review of Economics 
& Statistics (1986), Vol: 68, pp.693-699. 
Zhang, Junsen. "Do Men with Higher Wages Marry Earlier or Later?" Economics 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: ]Je/il1itiol1s of Variables 
Variable Definition 
Currently Married Dummy of currently married is 1 if 
the status reported by respondents 
in the Census is married; otherwise, 
> is O. 
Age The number of complete years a 
person has passed since birth. 
Education Years of schooling 
Language 1 if one's mother language is 
Cantonese; 
o otherwise. 
Log Earnings Log of monthly income from main 
employment 
Experience proxy of actual working experience: 
age-year of schooling-6 
(for years of schooling ~ 9) 
age-IS (for years of sohooling < 9) 
Log household income Log of the total income of all 
persons who are in the household 
on the Census reference date. 
Elderly person 1 if there is persons aged 60 or over 
found in the household on the 
Census reference date; 
o otherwise. 
Head of the household 1 if the person is acknowledged by 
members of the household to be 
responsible for making major 
decisions affecting the household; 
o otherwise. 
Marriage dummies : D 1 is 1 if married; 0 otherwise. 
DI , D2 D2 is 1 if widowed or divorced or 
separated; 0 otherwise. 
Duration of residence in Hong 1 if greater than or equal to 7 years 
Kong in Hong Kong (permanent 
residents); 0 otherwise. 
Nationality 1 if nationality is British or Chinese; 
o otherwise. 
"'-
Inverse Mill's Ratio 
Spouse's education Years of schooling of one's spouse. 
Other cash income All cash which are not 
remuneration for work are included 
e.g. interest, dividend, rental, 
welfare payment, old age allowance 
etc. 
Sex 1 if male; 0 otherwise. 
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Ind (Industry dummy) / Fld (Field 1 if husband and wife are working 
dummy) in the same industry / same field~ 
o otherwise. 
Mgr (Occupation dummy) 1 if husband and wife are working 
in managerial c1ass~ 0 otherwise. 
Age at marriage Age at first marriage. 
Log hourly wage rate Log of hourly wage rate. 
Educm Mother's years of schooling. 
richg 1 if father-in-law is richl 4~ 0 
otherwise. 
Preschool children 1 if one's youngest child is less than 
age 6; 0 otherwise. 
Duration of marriage Years got married. 
Weekly hours of work Number of working hours per 
week. 
Predicted log wage Predicted log of hourly wage rate. 
Log dowry Log of real value of dowry. 
Husband's Earnings Husband's monthly ear.nings 
14The definition of rich used in this thesis is same as the definition of 'very rich' used in the 1989 
Family Survey of Taiwan women. 
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Table 3.4: Probit Estimate of Marriage 
Variable Male Female 
Age 0.03022 0.05481 
(12 .124) (22.752) 
Education 0.01886 -0.4880 
. (2 .3600) (2 .6632) 
Language 0.10897 0.12289 
(1.1462) (1 .6450) 
Constant -4.1333 -4 .9888 
(20.432) (26.824) 
N 19497 18401 
Notes: Absolute value oft-statistics are ill parentheses. 
Table 3.5: Means (Standard ])eviations) of Variables 
Men Women 
Variable Full sample married sample Full sample married sample 
Log 7.0489 7.3378 4.3100 3.7940 
Monthly (3 .5486) (3 .6942) (4 .2486) ( 4.3239) 
Earnings 
Education 9.5658 9.7140 8.7332 8.4466 
(3 .8860) (4.4044) (4 .3878) (4.5752) 
Experience 19.963 30.060 19.948 26.516 
(14.045) (14.431) (14 .035) (13 .608) 
Experience2 595 .78 1111.8 594.88 888.21 







Log 9.4545 9.3698 9.6235 9.3698 
Household (0.7174) (0 .7965) (0.7415) (0.7965) 
Income 
Elderly 0.2877 0.3204 0.3274 0.3204 
person (0.4527) (0.4666) (0.4676) (0.4666) 
Head of the 0.5877 0.7895 0.1504 0.3814 
Household (0.4932) (0.4077) {0.3575) (0.4858) 
Log Other 0.6525 0.9623 0.5499 0.7838 
Cash (2 .2279) (2 .5632) (2 .0294) (2.2920) 
Income 
N 19497 3325 18401 3325 
Notes: Full sample is sample o/eligible population in (he 1% 1991 Hong Kong Census da ta. 
Atfarried sample contains the currently II/arried working observations who Qre living with his or her spouse. 
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Table 3.6: Probit Estimates of the Full Sample 
Variable Men Women 
Experience 0.1324 0.0797 
(38 .714) (26.935) 
Experience2 0.0028 -0.0017 
. (38 .714) (32.691) 
Education 0.1080 0.0800 
(9.0112) (8.9413) 
D1 0.1851 -0.8703 
( 4.288) (25.634) 
D2 0.1939 -0.4922 
(1 .9355) (8 .2361 ) 
Log Other -0 .1488 -0.1016 
Cash (28 .870) (18 .955) 
Income 
Log 0.3486 0.2993 
Household (20.597) (21.588) 
Income 
Elderly 0.0942 0.2574 
person (3 .1911 ) (10.677) 
Head of the 0.5030 0.2993 
Household (13 .710) (21.588) 
Constant -2 .7041 -2.5845 
(16.107) (19.223) 
N (working) 16190 9971 
N (non- 3307 8430 
working) 
N 19497 18401 
Notes: Absolute value oft-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 3. 7: Estinlates of Log Earnings Equations 
Men Women 
Variable Full Full Married Full Full Married 
sample sample sample sample sample sample 
Experience 0.0427 0.0070 0.0072 0.0374 0.0144 0.0119 
(15 .06) (2 .689) (2 .273) (13 .94) (5.408) (3.869) 
Experience2 -0.0009 -0.2085 -0.2930 -0.0008 -0.3544 -0.1324 
(16.39) xl0-3 xl0-3 (15 .05) xl0-3 xl0-3 
(4.134) (5.088) (6.404) (2.131) 
Education 0.0050 0.0201 0.0485 0.0390 0.0193 0.0687 
(1 .038) (4.256) (17.94) (6.255) (3 .062) (23.11) 
Spouse's 
., 
0.0363 0.0316 - - - -
Education (11 .68) (12.10) 
Log Other Cash 0.0919 - 0.0021 0.1027 - 0.0052 
Income (23.41 ) (0 .6517) (19.71) (1.182) 
Dl 0.1088 0.1580 - 0.6714 0.4623 -
(9.566) (13 .64) (25 .04) (17 .71) 
D2 0.0210 0.0723 - 0.3776 0.3152 -
(0.590) (1 .957) (11.14) (9.240) 
Duration of 0.0921 0.1067 -0 .1883 0.2212 0.2480 -0 .0014 
Residence (2.915) (3 .237) (5.389) (10.53) (11.50) (0.0474) 
Nationality 0.4110 0.4696 0.3135 -0.3897 -0 .3519 -0.0030 
(9.971) (10 .84) (3 .688) (15 .33) (11.49) (0.0505) 
Inverse Mill's -1.8511 -1.1367 -0.0175 -1.4611 -0 .9908 -0.2674 
Ratio (33.49) (23 .87) (1 .020) (30.99) (21.50) (2.337) 
Constant 8.8779 8.4169 8.3287 8.5457 8.1805 7.7104 
(175 .8) (167 .60) (149 .5) (167.4) (13.49) (143.7) 
R2 0.4321 0.3636 0.2400 0.4270 0.3895 0.2967 
N 19497 19497 3325 18401 18401 3325 
Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics are ill parentheses. 
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Table 3. 7a: Estinlates of Lo/: Earnin/:s Equations o.f Married Sample 
Variable 
Men Women 
Experience 0.0029 0.01608 
(1.115) (4 .037) 
Experience2 -0.1229 -0.2143 
x10-3 x10-3 
(2.741) (4.496) 
Education 0.0598 0.0822 




Log Other Cash 0.0034 0.0063 
Income (1 .011) (1.425) 
Duration of 0.1541 0.2515 
Residence (8 .162) (10 .76) 
Nationality 4.7889 0.0922 
(5.253) (1 .383) 
Inverse Mi 11' s -0 .0166 -0 .0465 
Ratio (0.950) (4 .037) 
Constant 8.3403 7.6903 
(150.5) (136.7) 
R2 0.2120 0.2729 
N 3325 3325 
Notes: Absolute value ojt-statistics are ill parentheses. 
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Table 3.8: Probit Estinlates o.f the Married Sample 
Variable Men Women 
Experience 0.0059 0.4387 x 10-3 
(0.7046) (0.4949) 
Experience2 -0.9841 x 10-3 -0.4310 x 10-3 
~ (8 .0433) (5 .3111) 
Education 0.0079 0.0272 
(1.5754) (7 .1455) 
Log Other -0.1311 -0.0568 
Cash (21.531) (7 .859) 
Income 
Log 0.3287 0.2979 
Household (13.897) (16 .836) 
Income 
Elderly -0.1039 0.1276 
person (2 .0166) (3 .8675) 
Head of the 0.2686 0.0972 
Household (5 .9494) (2.5188) 
Constant -0.9501 -2.8363 
(3 .801) (16.682) 
N (working) 11385 5516 
N (non- 196 6329 
working) 
N 11581 11845 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.10: Estimates of Log Earnings Equations 
Variable Married Sample of Married Sample of 
Working Sample Couples Working Sample Couples 
(Same Industry) Working in the (Same Field) Working in the 
Same Industry Same Field 
Experience > 0.4500xl0-3 0.00809 0.3312x 1 0-3 0.0099 
(0.1169) (1.433) (0 .086) (l.558) 
Experience2 -0.5027xl0-4 -0.2476xl0-3 -0.4 725x 10-4 -0.2806xl0-3 
(0 .768) (2 .525) (0 .722) (2 .536) 
Education 0.0880 0.05573 0.0882 0.05057 
(17.34) (7 .866) (17.39) (6.159) 
Spouse's 0.0307 0.0071 0.0302 0.0038 
Education (6 .559) (1 .015) (6.401) (0.4646) 
Sex 0.3917 0.3873 0.3919 0.3834 
(15 .97) (10.55) (15.98) (9.093) 
Ind*Spouse's 0.0077 - - -
Education (3 .225) 
Mgr*Spouse's 
- 0.0465 - 0.0455 
Education (13 .14) (11.27) 
Fld*Spouse's 
- - 0.7321 xl 0-2 -
Education (3.234) 
Duration of 0.1866 0.2429 0.1873 0.3049 
Residence (2.976) (2 .871) (2 .994) (3 . 111 ) 
Nationality 0.2007 0.0795 0.19501 -0.3225 
(2.390) (0 .7841) (2 .333) (0 .2748) 
Log Other 0.04047 0.02005 0.0402 0.1316 
Cash (5 .864) (1 .995) (5 .840) (1 .119) 
Income 
Constant 7.2594 7.6600 7.2559 7.6997 
(75.84) (57.22) (75.84) (47.98) 
R2 0.4414 0.4922 0.4414 0.4682 
N 2922 920 2922 1212 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.1 Means (Standard Deviations) of Variables 
Husbands Wives 
Variable Working Working Working Eligible Working 
. sample I sample 11 sample I population sample 11 
sample 
Log Wage 4.4793 4.5269 3.8466 - 3.9579 
Rate (0.61023) (1.9151) (0.7082) (0.6834) 
(Hourly) 
Age 48 .609 42 .804 46.164 - 38.363 
(6.7527) (9.1151) (5 .3264) (7.6689) 
Education 10.265 10.094 8.4020 - 8.4095 
(5.6114) (4 .0603) ( 4.3938) (4.3940) 
Spouse's - 8.4932 - 7.9334 10.023 
Education (4 .1149) (4 .3898) (4 .2362) 
Experience - 17.794 - 22.565 17.263 
(12 .940) (8.8659) (11.366) 
Age at 22.781 27 .310 22 .665 - 23 .166 
Marriage (3 .3695) (4.8978) (3.4667) (3.3396) 
Education* - 106.19 - - 108.39 
Duration of (70 .133) (94.429) 
Marriage 









- - - 1.8651 -
Mother's (3.1414 ) 
Education 
N 808 153 7 439 1216 1111 
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Table 4.2: Estimates of Age at Marriage Equations 
Variable Husbands Wives 
Log 0.92615 0.07327 
Hourly (4.199) (0.3391) 
Wage Rate 
Age ~ -0 .09409 -0.67844 
(5 .676) (0.2738) 
Education 0.05281 0.05281 
(1.497) (1.497) 
Constant 22.705 22.705 
(18 .58) (15 .58) 
R2 0.0960 0.0960 
N 808 439 
Notes: Absolute va /lIe of t-statistics are ill parelltheses. 
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Table 4.3: Pro bit Estimates and Estimates o.f LOI! Wal!e Rate Equations 
Husbands Wives 
Variable Log Wage Rate Probit Equation Log Wage Rate 
Equation Estimates Estimates Equation Estimates 
Experience 0.2956 x 10-1 -0.0152 0.7122 x 10-2 
> (4.215) (0.6225) (0.9068) 
Experience2 -0.4740 x 10-3 0.3534x 10-4 -0.1144 x 10-5 
(4.499) (0.0992) (0.0093) 
Education 0.0389 0.04729 0.0557 
(7.826) (2.7747) (7.351 ) 
Spouse's 0.03240 - 0.2263 
Education (6.199) (3 .136) 
Spouse's 0.3833 x 10-3 - 0.8332 x 10-4 
Education* (1.213) (0.2107) 
Duration of 
Marriage 
Constant 3.4300 0.9628 3.2483 
(25 .78) (2 .0183) (47 .53) 
Inverse - - -0.4797 
Mill's Ratio (1. 720) 
Father-in-
- -0 .1661 -
law's Wealth (1.8315) 
Dummy 
Mother's - 0.0361 -
Education (2.0677) 
Presence of - -0.2055 -
Preschool (1.5412) 
Children 
R2 0.2311 - 0.2302 
N (working - 1111 -
wives) 
N (non- - 105 -
working 
wives) 
N 1537 1216 1111 
Notes: Absolute value oil-statistics are ill parentheses. 
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Table 4.4 Married Women Labor Supply 
(Weekly Working Hours) Equation Estimate 
Variable Married Women 
> (Labor supply function 4.4) 
Predicted Log Wage -9.4425 
(1.966) 






Preschool Children -2 .6417 
(1.986) 
Husband's Monthly Earnings -0.4235 
(1 .806) 






Notes: Absolute value of t-statistics are in parelllheses. 
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Table 4.5: Means (Standard Deviations) of Variables 
Variable Married Women 
Weekly Working Hours 51.586 
, (18 .945) 
Wives' Monthly Earnings 12878 
(9205 .1) 
Nominal Value of Dowry 89364 
(0.18441x10-6) 
Predicted Log Wage of 3.9330 
Wives (0.3276) 






Presence of Preschool 0.3568 
Children (0.4795) 
Husband's Monthly Earnings 18583 
(14703) 
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